Description: This paper models minimum pension guarantee using a simulation approach. Lachance and Mitchell [2002] have shown that it could be important if and when individual accounts are introduced in the United States. This paper's model uses real data from Mexico where individual accounts are already a reality and the minimum pension guarantee is already enshrined by law. The authors calculate the probability of the government needing to honor the guarantee and estimate the cost of such a promise using a real options approach. Higher investment in the stock market turns out to be the key. The higher the proportion of investment allowed by law in stocks, the lower the probability of government support.

Description: Chapter 1 describes important changes in Mexico in the 1990s such as re-privatization of banks, relaxed financial regulation, membership in NAFTA and OECD, and political change at the federal level. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1.

Description: Chapter 4 describes growth issues including multiple account problems of the old SAR, the amount of money in the AFOREs, and portfolio composition in the AFOREs. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1.

Description: Chapter 3 describes the current situation in Mexico by which new workers must be a part of the mandated defined contribution plan. Older workers may opt to stay with the former defined benefit system. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1.

Description: Chapter 5 concludes that the results of the research into the system show that customer retention in the Mexican pension industry is related to specific dimensions of service quality. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1.

Description: Six appendices, all but the first detailing the AFOREs. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1.

Description: Chapter 6 raises the issue that pension privatization does not generate income. Consequently, a way must be found to continue payments to the transition generation still under the old pay-as-you-go system. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1

Description: Chapter 2 examines the long history of social security in Mexico, noting that for most of its history, Mexican social security was highly selective and never universal. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1.

Description: Chapter 7 develops a model of calculating the cost of managing funds in the Mexican pension system. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1.

Description: Chapter 8 describes the behavior of the AFOREs, how the funds could have performed minus the restrictions, and private company performance. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1.